

Left behind – can China learn international lessons to revitalise its rust belt?

NAB Group Economics

When we examine the transition currently underway in China’s economic model – away from investment (particularly in heavy industry) and towards a modern consumption based economy – we tend to focus on the net gains to the broader economy. However, periods of transition typically produce winners and losers, with the potential for negative impacts in some regions – an experience exhibited in many once prosperous industrial centres in many Western economies (the so-called rust belts).

THE GRADUAL DECLINE OF CHINA’S RUST BELT

China’s traditional rust belt is centred on three provinces in the country’s northeast – coastal Liaoning and landlocked Jilin and Heilongjiang. At the start of the People’s Republic, these provinces were comparatively well developed, benefiting from access to natural resources and a comparatively higher level of industrialisation – in particular two major steel mills at Anshan and Benxi (both in Liaoning province) that were established during the Japanese occupation.

CHINA’S RUST BELT

Three key provinces north east of Beijing




Provincial GDP measures are often considered unreliable – given that the sum of these measures exceeds the national total – however the data points

to the changing importance of the rust belt to China’s overall economy. In 1960, the region accounted for around one-fifth of China’s economic activity. By the start of the reform period in 1978, this share had fallen significantly, to around 14% – as national security concerns had contributed to the geographic diversification of industry centres – albeit these remained primarily located in the northern provinces of the country.

A LONG SLOW DECLINE

Rust belt’s falling share of China’s GDP



The period of reform and opening up that commenced in 1978 provided considerable benefit to southern regions of the country – which had been underdeveloped until this time. Most notable was the development of Guangdong province (and in particular the Pearl River Delta region) – which quickly became a key manufacturing hub for consumer products (commonly dubbed ‘the factory to the world’). The relative performances of Guangdong and China’s rust belt since 1978 are stark – the former recorded a sharp increase in its share of GDP (from

around 5% in 1978 to 10% in 2015 – albeit this level is off peaks in the mid 2000s), while the latter diminished – down from 14% of GDP in 1978 to around 8% in 2015.

In particular, the region suffered during the 1990s reforms to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) – which saw around 30 million workers lose their jobs across the country. Around one-quarter of these job losses were in the rust belt provinces (The Economist).

The region remains an important steel producer – accounting over 9% of China’s output in 2015 – however it has long since been overtaken in importance by neighbouring Hebei – which produced nearly a quarter of the total. It is also a major producer of motor vehicles – at around 16% of the total in 2014.

The reliance on heavy industry is somewhat problematic for the rust belt, as China’s transition towards a consumption driven economy means that it is increasingly reliant on the faster growing services sector.


RUST BELT REGION POORLY STRUCTURED FOR TRANSITION

The rust belt region has continued to underperform in recent times – as service focussed provinces have driven a greater share of China’s growth. In 2015, the three rust belt provinces were among the four weakest growing regions – along with coal-rich Shanxi. Liaoning reported the lowest level of real economic growth, at just 3.0% in 2015, and recorded a decline of 1.0% in the first half of 2016.

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 2015

Rust belt among the weakest performers

GDP growth 2015 (%)



Source: CEIC, NAB Economics


In part, the poor economic performance of the rust belt region reflects an inability to successfully transition to China’s new growth model. The rust belt’s economic growth has remained overly dependent on investment – with investment’s share of GDP at around 64% in 2014 (the most recent data available) – compared with the national share of 47%.

Average wages in the region have lagged the national trend (particularly in Jilin and Heilongjiang), limiting the capacity of consumers to contribute to the broader economic transition.

INVESTMENT SHARE OF GDP

Rust belt over-reliant on investment

Investment share of GDP (by expenditure) (%)



Source: CEIC, NAB Economics

Similarly, there are institutional hurdles that prove resistant to change. We have previously highlighted the challenges around reforms to the broader SOE sector, and SOEs represent a larger share of the rust belt economy (at around 50% of regional GDP in 2014) than the national average (around 30%) (The Economist).

CONCLUSION

The experience of rust belts in Western economies highlights the challenges facing Chinese authorities during the economic transition. These regions have typically under-performed in terms of economic growth and have had higher rates of unemployment and social disadvantage. Sustained underperformance could have significant political implications in China – as highlighted by the rise of populism in a range of Western rust belt regions.

The partial reforms to the household registration (hukou) system limit the capacity of rust belt residents to relocate to more prosperous regions. Authorities – particularly at the local level – will have to continue the drive for reform in the rust belt provinces, to reduce the importance of industrial SOEs and support service sector growth.

CONTACT THE AUTHOR

Gerard Burg

Senior Economist – Asia

Gerard.Burg@nab.com.au

+613 8634 2788

+61 477 723 768

Group Economics

Alan Oster
Group Chief Economist
+61 3 8634 2927

Jacqui Brand
Personal Assistant
+61 3 8634 2181

Australian Economics and Commodities

Riki Polygenis
Head of Australian Economics
+(61 3) 8697 9534

James Glenn
Senior Economist – Australia
+(61 3) 9208 8129

Vyanne Lai
Economist – Australia
+(61 3) 8634 0198

Phin Ziebell
Economist – Australia
+61 (0) 475 940 662

Amy Li
Economist – Australia
+(61 3) 8634 1563

Behavioural & Industry Economics

Dean Pearson
Head of Behavioural & Industry Economics
+(61 3) 8634 2331

Robert De Iure
Senior Economist – Behavioural & Industry Economics
+(61 3) 8634 4611

Brien McDonald
Senior Economist – Behavioural & Industry Economics
+(61 3) 8634 3837

Steven Wu
Economist – Behavioural & Industry Economics
+(613) 9208 2929

International Economics

Tom Taylor
Head of Economics, International
+(61 3) 8634 1883

Tony Kelly
Senior Economist – International
+(61 3) 9208 5049

Gerard Burg
Senior Economist – Asia
+(61 3) 8634 2788

John Sharma
Economist – Sovereign Risk
+(61 3) 8634 4514

Global Markets Research

Peter Jolly
Global Head of Research
+61 2 9237 1406

Australia

Economics
Ivan Colhoun
Chief Economist, Markets
+61 2 9237 1836

David de Garis
Senior Economist
+61 3 8641 3045

Tapas Strickland
Economist
+61 2 9237 1980

FX Strategy
Ray Attrill
Global Co-Head of FX Strategy
+61 2 9237 1848

Rodrigo Catril
Currency Strategist
+61 2 9293 7109

Interest Rate Strategy
Skye Masters
Head of Interest Rate Strategy
+61 2 9295 1196

Alex Stanley
Senior Interest Rate Strategist
+61 2 9237 8154

Credit Research
Michael Bush
Head of Credit Research
+61 3 8641 0575

Simon Fletcher
Senior Credit Analyst – FI
+61 29237 1076

Andrew Jones
Credit Analyst
+61 3 8641 0978

Distribution
Barbara Leong
Research Production Manager
+61 2 9237 8151

New Zealand

Stephen Toplis
Head of Research, NZ
+64 4 474 6905

Craig Ebert
Senior Economist
+64 4 474 6799

Doug Steel
Senior Economist
+64 4 474 6923

Kymerly Martin
Senior Market Strategist
+64 4 924 7654

Jason Wong
Currency Strategist
+64 4 924 7652

Yvonne Liew
Publications & Web Administrator
+64 4 474 9771

UK/Europe

Nick Parsons
Head of Research, UK/Europe,
and Global Co-Head of FX Strategy
+44207710 2993

Gavin Friend
Senior Markets Strategist
+44 207 710 2155

Derek Allassani
Research Production Manager
+44 207 710 1532

Asia

Christy Tan
Head of Markets
Strategy/Research, Asia
+852 2822 5350

Julian Wee
Senior Markets Strategist, Asia
+65 6632 8055

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